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Abstract—Recent works have shown that the input domain of
any machine learning classifier is bound to contain adversarial
examples. Thus, we can no longer hope to immune classifiers
against adversarial examples and instead can only aim to achieve
the following two defense goals: 1) make adversarial examples
harder to find, or 2) weaken their adversarial nature by pushing
them further away from correctly classified data points. Most, if
not all, of the previously suggested defense mechanisms address
just one of those two goals and as such, can be bypassed by
adaptive attacks that take the defense mechanism into consid-
eration. In this work, we suggest a novel defense mechanism
that simultaneously addresses both defense goals: We flatten
the gradients of the loss surface, making adversarial examples
harder to find by using a novel stochastic regularization term
that explicitly decreases the sensitivity of individual neurons to
small input perturbations. In addition, we push the decision
boundary away from correctly classified inputs by leveraging
Jacobian regularization. We present a solid theoretical basis and
an empirical testing of our suggested approach, demonstrate its
superiority over previously suggested defense mechanisms, and
show that it is effective against a wide range of adaptive attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently published works have established the inevitability
of adversarial examples [1]–[4]. Despite a few theoretical
aspects that still require further research attention, these pub-
lications collectively imply that adversarial examples exist
within the input space of each and every classification model.
That is, the input space of any classifier is bound to in-
clude incorrectly classified input samples which are located
in proximity to correctly classified input. The existence of
such adversarial data points is unavoidable regardless of the
learning algorithm, training dataset, or hyperparameters used
in creating the model. Accepting the inevitability of adversarial
examples means that defenders can only hope to a) make such
examples harder to find, or b) weaken their adversarial nature
by reducing their similarity to correctly classified inputs. These
two defense goals are largely independent of one another, and
often a given defense mechanism addresses just one of them.
Many of the commonly used methods for finding ad-
versarial examples rely on the gradients of the classifier’s
loss surface [5]–[8]. Those methods utilize greedy, iterative
optimization schemes (e.g., stochastic gradient descent) to
traverse the loss surface in search of the smallest perturbation
that will cause the classifier to predict an incorrect class label.
For this reason, making adversarial examples harder to find
is typically associated with gradient obfuscation [9]. That is,
many of the suggested approaches for increasing the difficulty
of finding adversarial examples attempt to either eliminate the
loss gradient or alternatively to cause the behaviour of the
gradient to be inconsistent in proximity to known training
samples. The result, in both cases, is that gradient-based
optimization becomes considerably harder to implement.
More recently, efficient approaches for traversing the clas-
sifier decision boundary itself [10], as opposed to the loss
surface, were suggested. Those methods are able to produce
highly refined adversarial examples without relying on the
classifier’s loss or its gradient. In fact, such methods are
applicable even when the classifier’s loss function is non-
differentiable. In order to mitigate such attack methods, a
defender must ‘push’ the decision boundary away from the
correctly classified training samples, increasing the mean
perturbation distance (i.e., the distance between a valid input
and the corresponding adversarial examples), and in so doing,
weaken the adversarial nature of the resulting adversarial
examples.
A large number of defense mechanisms against adversarial
perturbations have been proposed. Some attempted to increase
the complexity of finding relevant adversarial examples [11]–
[13], while others aimed to increase the distance between
correctly classified inputs and the classifier’s decision bound-
ary [14], [15]. However, most, if not all, of those approaches
were quickly bypassed by tailor-made, adaptive attacks [16]–
[18]; i.e., if an adversary is aware of the existence of a defense
mechanism, he/she can adapt the attack method in order to
bypass that defense. A defense mechanism that can address
both defense goals listed above and sustain adaptive attacks
has yet to be discovered.
In this work, we suggest a novel approach for increasing
the resilience of neural network-based classifiers to adversarial
attacks. Our approach aims to simultaneously increase the
difficulty in finding adversarial examples and increase the
mean perturbation distance achieved via black-box boundary-
based approaches. Increased complexity is achieved by intro-
ducing stochastic noise into the network’s training phase and
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explicitly regularizing the changes inflicted to the activation
values of individual neurons. Pushing the decision boundary
away from correctly classified inputs is done based on the
well-studied Jacobian regularization [19] technique.
Instead of attempting to completely deflect adversarial at-
tacks, our goal is to render optimization-based attack methods
ineffective, while at the same time increasing the mean pertur-
bation distance so that the resulting perturbation can no longer
be considered ‘similar’ to the valid input. We test our approach
extensively using the popular MNIST [20] and CIFAR-10 [21]
benchmark datasets. We follow current best practices [22] and
test our suggested approach against generic gradient-based
(white-box) attacks, tailor-made adaptive attacks, as well as
a (black-box) boundary-based attack. Our results show that a
training process which combines the two techniques results in
a model that is robust to both gradient-based and boundary-
based attacks.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Notations & Preliminaries
In the context of a model f (·), an input vector x′ is
considered to be an adversarial example if it is incorrectly
classified by f (·) despite being located in proximity to some
other, correctly classified, input x. More formally, given some
distance metric d and a small positive constant , we say that
x′ is a non-targeted adversarial example when d
(
x, x′
)
< 
and f (x) 6= f (x′). We refer to x′ as a targeted adversarial
example if f
(
x′
)
equals some target class t chosen by
the adversary. In the image classification domain, which we
use in this work in order to evaluate our proposed method,
three distance metrics are typically used: L0 – measures the
number of perturbed input features (pixels), L2 – measures the
Euclidean distance between the two input vectors, and L∞ –
measures the maximal change applied to any single feature.
B. The Inevitability of Adversarial Examples
The initial discovery of adversarial examples in deep neural
networks (DNNs) unleashed an arms race of attack and
defense methods. However, for the most part, attackers seem
to have the upper hand in this process. Numerous methods for
creating classification models that are resilient to adversarial
manipulations were suggested, however they were all bypassed
by new, more sophisticated attacks. This has led researchers to
wonder whether adversarial examples are in fact an inevitable
artifact of DNNs or even of all machine learning (ML) based
classifiers.
A number of recent works have made considerable progress
in proving the adversarial inevitability assumption, making
it safe to assume that the input spaces of all ML classifiers
are bound to include adversarial examples [1], [3], [4], [23].
[23] show that adversarial resilience cannot be achieved with
a training dataset that is polynomial to the number of input
dimensions, which means that adversarial examples are in-
evitable for all practical purposes. [4] prove that in order to
fully block adversarial attack methods, one should eliminate
the network’s ability to learn. Alternatively, any new defense
mechanisms suggested should include a suitable training pro-
cedure that can balance the two contradicting needs.
C. Identifying Adversarial Examples
Knowing that adversarial examples exist within the input
space of the target classifier, the adversary does not actually
create adversarial examples, but rather searches for them in the
vicinity of the relevant input sample. Therefore, it would be
more accurate to discuss adversarial search methods instead of
adversarial attack methods. We will use the two terms attack
and search interchangeably throughout the rest of this paper.
Adversarial attack/search methods can largely be divided
into two categories: methods that traverse the classifier’s loss
surface and methods that explore the classifier’s decision
boundary itself. Loss surface traversal approaches typically
use gradient-based optimization methods, such as stochastic
gradient descent. Given some correctly classified input, those
methods attempt to maximize classification loss while at the
same time minimizing the perturbation distance. Early loss
surface-based attacks leveraged simple heuristics with respect
to the structure of the loss surface [5], [6]. This concept was
later enhanced by Carlini and Wagner [8] who were the first
to define a gradient-based optimization process in order to
identify adversarial examples. The core principles presented
in their work were later used in a large number of additional
attack methods [10], [24], [25].
Decision boundary-based attack methods operate by travers-
ing the decision boundary itself. They are unaffected by the
structure of the loss surface and can be used even if the clas-
sifier itself is based on some non-differentiable element. Such
models define boundary surfaces between different classes
(whether explicitly or implicitly), which can then be traversed
in order to find a minimal perturbation given some source
point. A notable example of this class of attack methods
is HopSkipJump [10], which has shown to be applicable to
all ML-based classification models. This method starts by
processing two input points together: a source point and an
additional data point which belongs to the desired target
class. It uses binary search in order to find the boundary
point that resides on the line connecting the two input points;
then it approximates the gradient of the boundary surface at
the boundary point using Monte Carlo search and uses this
approximation in order to gradually minimize the perturbation
distance. Notably, the HopSkipJump approach is applicable
to all ML-based classification models. Such models define
boundary surfaces between different classes (whether explic-
itly or implicitly), which can then be traversed in order to find
a minimal perturbation given some source point.
D. Defending Against Adversarial Perturbations
In recent years, numerous defense mechanisms addressing
the two attack categories mentioned above were suggested.
However, most, if not all, of those defense methods were
later bypassed using stronger, tailor-made adversarial search
methods referred to as Adaptive Attacks. To the best of our
knowledge, none of the defense methods suggested so far have
simultaneously addressed both loss surface and boundary-
based searches. As a result, defense mechanisms that prevented
loss surface-based attacks remained susceptible to boundary-
based attacks and vice versa.
Defending against loss surface-based attacks is generally
done by obfuscating or eliminating the loss gradient in the
vicinity of correctly classified inputs. A promising line of
research which has been explored by several groups is based
on injecting stochastic noise into the inference process. De-
fenses based on this concept have empirically demonstrated
improved robustness to adversarial examples [26], [27] and
were relatively difficult to overcome. Recently, a method
called randomized smoothing was suggested [2] in order to
allow the classifier to move away from the adversarial data
point into a correctly classified input subspace. This method
randomly picks multiple data points in the vicinity of the
original input, uses the classifier to infer a class label for
each of those random points, as well as the original input,
and eventually treats the majority vote as the correct class
label. In [28], the authors were able to support the empirical
results by proving that adversarial resilience is correlated with
the model’s resilience to Gaussian noise.
Our proposed approach differs from earlier works in two
key respects: a) we inject stochastic noise into the network’s
training process, as opposed to other methods that rely on
randomization during inference, and b) our random noise is
selected from a much wider neighborhood of the original in-
put. As will be described in upcoming sections, we believe that
those two properties make our proposed method considerably
harder to overcome using adaptive attacks.
Defending against decision boundary-based attacks is done
by increasing the generalization margins, and in so doing,
‘pushing’ the decision boundary away from correctly classified
data points. A number of works have explored different
variants of Jacobian regularization in order to achieve this goal
[14], [15].
E. Adaptive Defense Evaluation
The term adaptive attacks refers to adversarial attack meth-
ods that were tailored to counter a specific defense mech-
anism, where the attacker has complete knowledge of the
defense mechanism’s implementation details. The success of
adaptive methods in bypassing previously suggested defense
mechanisms has turned adaptive evaluation into a mandatory
step prior to the publication of a new defense mechanism.
Using cryptanalysis related terminology, any defense method
that fails to handle adaptive attacks is in essence a form of
’security by obscurity.’ It is based on the defender’s ability to
keep some parts of the defense mechanism hidden from the
attacker.
Adaptive attacks were first suggested in the context of
loss surface-based attack methods [16]. Most notably, this
work suggests using the expectancy of the loss gradient
measured over multiple inference acts of the same input in
order to counter the effect of stochastic noise injected at
inference time. Another related approach, which is commonly
known as random restart, executes a base attack method while
slightly perturbing the input point with random noise each
time. As will be discussed later, both of the approaches are
relevant when the stochastic element of the suggested defense
mechanism is added during inference time. Our proposed
defense mechanism applies randomization to the network’s
original training phase and by that dramatically reduces the
effectiveness of the aforementioned adaptive methods.
Recently, the scope of adaptive attack methods was ex-
tended to include black-box boundary-based attacks as part
of the ‘adaptive toolbox’ [18]. As part of this work, the
authors devise adaptive attacks against 13 recently published
defense mechanisms. In two of the 13 cases, loss gradient-
based approaches obtain poor results or simply require too
much computational effort, leading the team to use black-
box boundary attacks instead. This understanding supports
our claim that any defense mechanism against adversarial
examples must simultaneously address both loss surface and
decision boundary-based attack methods.
As described in upcoming sections of this work, we evaluate
our proposed method against a range of adaptive attack meth-
ods and find it to be superior to previously suggested defense
mechanisms. We attribute this superiority to the combined
nature of our approach.
III. PROPOSED METHOD
A. Method Overview
The proposed method aims to simultaneously increase the
difficulty in finding adversarial examples and push the decision
boundary away from correctly classified data points. To do so,
the method integrates two independent regularization terms
into the classifier network’s loss function: 1) in order to
increase the complexity of finding adversarial examples, we
introduce a novel regularization term coined NsLoss that
penalizes the classifier for high sensitivity of the network’s
neurons to input perturbations; 2) in order to push away
the classifier’s decision boundaries we use the well studied
Jacobian regularization loss [14], [15].
Thus, we define a new training loss,
L = CELoss+ λ1 ·NsLoss+ λ2 · JacobRegLoss
where CELoss is the standard Cross Entropy loss, NsLoss
is our newly introduced loss term and JacobRegLoss is the
Jacobian regularization loss.
We apply the proposed method on an already trained model
by continuing to train it with the custom loss for a prede-
fined number of epochs using a standard stochastic gradient
descent based optimizer and a relatively low learning rate to
allow the model to gain robustness without “unlearning” the
classification task.
B. NsLoss Regularization Term
We will now provide a detailed description of how to
compute the NsLoss regularization term, as well as some
intuition about its effectiveness in destroying the loss gradient
landscape.
NsLoss computation: NsLoss is computed by first com-
puting the neural sensitivity using Algorithm 1 to obtain: (1)
LayerSensitivity(LS) - a mapping of a model layer to a
vector containing the sensitivity of each neuron in the layer,
and (2) MeanXLayerActivations(MLA) - a mapping of a
model layer to a vector containing the average absolute value
of the neuron activation over the current training batch. Then,
to obtain the NsLoss, we compute a sum over all layers of
the weighted sum of neuron sensitivity values weighted by
the mean activation of the neuron to assign a larger weight
to neurons with higher activation values. More formally, we
compute:
NsLoss←
∑
L∈Layers
LS[L] •MLA[L]
Algorithm 1 Neural sensitivity computation
1: Inputs:
2: M ← model being trained
3: X ← batch of training samples
4: NsEps← set L2 radius in which to estimate sensitivity
5: PG← Perturbation generator
6: N ← number of random perturbations to sample for each training sample
7: Layers← list of model layers to compute sensitivity for
8: Outputs:
9: LayersSensitivity ← mapping of layer to vector of per neuron sensitivity
scores
10: procedure COMPUTENEURALSENSITIVITY(M , X , NsEps, PG, N , Layers)
11: for x ∈ X do
12: X(i)p , i ∈ ZN ← Use PG to generate N random samples x1, x2, ...,
xN with
∥∥x− xj∥∥2 = NsEps
13: end for
14: PerLayerXActivations← Evaluate M(X) and store activations of each
layer ∈ Layers
15: for i ∈ ZN do
16: PerLayerXpActivations(i) ← Evaluate M(X(i)p ) and store activa-
tions of each layer ∈ Layers
17: end for
18: for layerL ∈ Layers do
19: PerLayerActivationDiffSums[L] ←∑N
i=1
∣∣∣PerLayerXpActivations(i)[L]− PerLayerXActivations[L]∣∣∣
20: MeanXLayerActivations[L] ←∑len(X)
i=1
∣∣∣∣PerLayerXActivations[L](i)∣∣∣∣
len(X)
. element-wise sum of activation
vectors over the input samples in the batch
21: LayerSensitivity[L] ←
PerLayerActivationDiffSums[L]
len(X)·N·NsEps·len(L)·MeanXLayerActivations[L]
22: end for
23: return LayerSensitivity,MeanXLayerActivations
24: end procedure
Intuition about the effectiveness of NsLoss regularization:
The NsLoss regularization term is constructed in a way that pe-
nalizes the model for big differences in the activations of both
the output neurons (logits) and internal neurons of the model,
originating from random input perturbations in a predefined L2
ball around each training sample. This has the obvious effect
of optimizing the model to minimize said differences. Thus,
upon successful optimization, the model’s logits are expected
to become close to constant in the respective L2 balls, causing
flattening of the loss surface and bringing the loss gradients
close to zero. Once aggregated over the entire training set
during the training process this is expected to have the effect
of zeroing the loss gradients in an NsEps neighborhood of
the entire data manifold, where NsEps is the hyper-parameter
specifying the radius of the L2 ball from which random input
perturbation are sampled during the computation of the NsLoss
regularization term.
C. Hyperparameters
The following is a description of the hyperparameters used
in our defense.
• N - The number of perturbed samples to use to estimate
the neuron sensitivity: We used a constant N=5 in all ex-
periments. This parameter has a substantial impact on the
performance as additional N forward propagations of the
model are performed for each input sample, increasing
the training time in a linear fashion.
• NsEps - The radius of the L2 ball from which perturba-
tions for neuron sensitivity computation are generated.
• {Ri} - The set of regularizers/penalty terms used to train
the model out of:
– full - Regularize the sensitivity of the logits and all
ReLU outputs in all layers of the model using the
NsLoss term described in section III-B
– jacobian reg - The Jacobian regularization loss as
implemented in [14].
• {λi} - The weights of the loss terms. For each regulariza-
tion term Ri, a value of λi that is too high would cause
the respective term to outweigh the cross-entropy loss,
resulting in a model with accuracy at the level of random
guessing. A value of λi that is too low, on the other
hand, would have negligible effect on model robustness.
Thus, we strive to choose the largest value of λi that
doesn’t hurt the model’s cross-entropy loss and validation
set accuracy. Specifically, we followed the protocol below
to choose each λi
1) For a standard model, compute the values of Ri on
10 random batches from the training and validation
sets and store the average value as Ri0 .
2) Choose λi0 =
log2NumClasses
Ri0
.
3) Perform a binary search by selecting values of λi
that are larger and smaller than λi0 but in the same
order of magnitude. For each such λi, start training
the model for an epoch. If the training cross-entropy
loss reaches the cross-entropy of a random guess
(log2NumClasses), then λi is too high; otherwise
it can be increased further.
IV. EVALUATION
A. Robustness Evaluation Methodology
Threat model. We evaluate the robustness of models trained
using our defensive method in a white-box threat model, i.e.,
one in which the attacker has full access to the trained model,
as well as information about the methods and parameters
used to train the model. In this work we limit ourselves to
L2 attacks for the sake of simplicity, but the method can
be naturally extended to defend against attacks targeting L0,
L∞ and other norms as well by aligning the sampling of
random perturbations used in the computation of the NsLoss
regularization term with the norm the adversarial attack is
operating on, and possibly combining regularization terms
targeting multiple norms.
White-box evaluation best practices. It is well known in the
field that defense evaluation requires testing the model against
a wide range of attacks, the most prominent of which are:
(1) generic gradient-based (white-box) attacks; (2) boundary-
based gradient free (black-box) attacks; (3) transferability
attacks, i.e., evaluating the robustness to adversarial examples
created against an undefended, substitute model; and (4) adap-
tive attacks, i.e., attacks that are tailored to defeat the defenses
using a suitable choice of attack configuration parameters,
as well as customizing state-of-the-art attacks to make them
more effective against the specific defense [16]–[18], [22].
Specifically, we evaluate our defense’s capabilities in the face
of the following attacks:
1) Generic gradient-based attacks. We use the PGD and
C&W attacks with the L2 norm. For PGD, we use a
strong attack configuration with a large number of iter-
ations. For C&W, we use different number of iterations
and target confidence values (see Table II for details).
2) Boundary-based attacks. We use the strong Hop-
SkipJump attack method with the L2 norm.
3) Transferability attacks. We evaluate the transferability of
all of the above attacks by creating adversarial examples
against an undefended model, and evaluating the robust
model on them to compute the adversarial test accuracy.
4) Adaptive attacks. In contrast to most defense methods
that succumbed to approaches, such as backward pass
differentiable approximation (BPDA) [16], expectation
over transformation (EOT) [16], and variations of the
C&W attack with a customized loss function [17], our
approach is inherently difficult to attack adaptively as
it lacks any explicit inference time mechanisms that the
attacker needs to overcome. To challenge our defense,
we use two strengthened variations of the C&W attack:
• Attack restarts with random initialization - The stan-
dard C&W implementation searches for a minimal
perturbation starting with an all-zero perturbation
vector. Our variation starts with a uniformly sam-
pled perturbation of an L2 norm given by an input
parameter. We perform a configurable number of
restarts of the attack, each with a different random
initial perturbation. This attack aims at overcoming
a flat gradient surface in the vicinity of an attacked
input sample by “jumping” out of the gradient
valley/plateau and then starting the gradient-based
search.
• Gradient expectation over randomness - We modi-
fied the standard C&W gradient computation with
one that averages the gradient values over a config-
urable sized set of inputs chosen at random from an
L2 ball with configurable radius around the current
input sample. This attack aims at overcoming a
noisy gradient surface by smoothing the gradient
values used for the attack.
Dataset Defense Hyperparameters Add. Info
λi  N epoch ACC
MNIST
NsLoss 2.0 1.0 5 20 95.65
JacobReg 0.01 N/A N/A 20 94.95
Combined 2.0,0.01 1.0 5 20 96.22
CIFAR10
NsLoss 10.0 3.0 10 100 88.96
JacobReg 0.1 N/A N/A 100 87.60
Combined 10.0,0.01 3.0 10 100 89.02
TABLE I: Model hyperparameters
Evaluation metrics We measure the robustness of the evalu-
ated models using the well established adversarial test accu-
racy metric. This metric is calculated by executing an adversar-
ial attack on the entire test set (or a subset of it) and computing
the accuracy of the model on the set of samples generated by
the attack, which are a mix of adversarial examples (where an
attack succeeds) and normal samples (where the attack fails).
In order to provide a deeper understanding of the model’s
robustness, the adversarial test accuracy is measured for a wide
range of perturbation budgets (i.e., the L2 norm between the
original sample and the resulting adversarial sample).
B. Evaluation Setup
Datasets and base models. Conforming to common prac-
tice in the field, we evaluate the defense on the classic MNIST
[20] and CIFAR-10 [21] image classification datasets. For
CIFAR-10, we use a pretrained VGG19 model [29] which
achieves clean test accuracy of 92.43%, whereas for MNIST,
we use a model architecture taken from the Keras MNIST ex-
ample (https://keras.io/examples/mnist cnn/) which achieves
clean test accuracy of 99.25%.
Optimization and hyperparameters. All of the robust mod-
els were created by starting with a pretrained model and
retraining with the configured set of regularization terms.
Specifically, we trained the models using the Adam optimizer
at a low learning rate of 1e − 4. For MNIST, we trained for
20 epochs, and for CIFAR-10, we trained for 100 epochs.
Table I summarizes the configurations of the robust models’
hyperparameters.
Hardware. All experiments were executed on a dedicated
server with 8 x NVIDIA RTX 2080 Ti (11GB RAM) GPUs.
Attack configurations. For untargeted attacks, we randomly
selected 1,024 samples from the respective test set to serve as
the attack inputs, whereas for targeted attacks, we randomly
selected 113 samples from the respective test set, and launched
an attack targeting each possible target class (except for the
real class), for a total of 1,017 attack instances (both MNIST
and CIFAR-10 have 10 target classes, thus we have 10-1=9
attack instances per sample). To be sure that the results of
the attacks are comparable across different models and attack
types, we set a constant random seed with the meaningful
value of 42 for each attack sequence (to ensure that the same
random samples are chosen each time).
Table II presents the attack types and parameters. For each
attack we use both the targeted and untargeted variants, where
applicable. We used state-of-the-art, open-source implemen-
tations of the various attacks using the following popular
Type Attack Name D Add. Info Impl. Parameters
Gradient
C&W
L2 Standard foolbox
steps=1,000; stepsize={CIFAR10:0.01,MNIST: 0.1};
initial const={CIFAR10:1e-3,MNIST: 10}; binary search steps=9; confidence=0
L2 High Conf foolbox
steps=1,000; stepsize={CIFAR10:0.01,MNIST: 0.1};
initial const={CIFAR10:1e-3, MNIST: 10}; binary search steps=9; confidence=5
L2 Strong foolbox
steps=10,000; stepsize={CIFAR10:0.01, MNIST: 0.1};
initial const={CIFAR10:1e-3, MNIST: 10}; binary search steps=9; confidence=0
PGD L2 Random Init advertorch rand init=True; eps ter=0.01; nb ter=1,000
Boundary HopSkipJump L2 ART init val=100; init size=1,000; max ter=50;
Adaptive C&W with Restarts L2 Random init foolbox number of restarts = 400C&W with Grad-Exp L2 Based on C&W custom steps=1,000; confidence=0; ge sample count=10; ge eps=0.01
TABLE II: Detailed attack parameters
frameworks: Foolbox [30], Advertorch [31], and Adversarial
Robustness Toolbox (ART) [32]. For all the attacks we used
L2 perturbation budgets of 0.01, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 3.0,
5.0, 10.0, and 20.0.
C. Results
Gradient-based and boundary-based attacks. Tables III
and IV contain a summary of the results of all generic gradient
and boundary-based attacks, represented by the adversarial test
accuracy, for two different perturbation budgets (): a small
budget that is at the boundary of perturbations perceivable by
the naked human eye and a large one to showcase the model’s
ability to cope with very large perturbations. In addition, in
Figures 2a and 2b we present complete plots of adversarial test
accuracy vs. perturbation budget () for a few representative
attacks.
These results clearly support our three main hypotheses,
namely: (1) The NsLoss regularization is highly effective in
thwarting gradient-based attacks, even for very large pertur-
bation budgets, as can be seen by the high test accuracy of
both the the NsLoss and Combined models for the gradient-
based attacks (PGD and CW variations). (2) The Jacobian
regularization is highly effective in thwarting boundary at-
tacks, as can be seen by the high test accuracy of both the
JacobReg and Combined models. (3) Using a combined loss
preserves the benefits of both the NsLoss and JacobReg, albeit
with slightly lower accuracy than the use of NsLoss alone, as
can be seen by comparing Combined against NsLoss for the
gradient attacks and against Jacobian regularization for the
HopSkipJump boundary attack.
Attack Standard JacobReg NsLoss Combined
1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5
U
nt
ar
ge
te
d CW-L2 3 1 27 4 11 11 75 10
CW-L2-HC 17 1 94 4 95 34 96 69
CW-L2-Strong 2 1 26 4 11 11 73 10
PGD-L2 58 29 55 3 35 9 84 31
Ta
rg
et
ed
CW-L2 17 4 54 33 64 0 94 60
CW-L2-HC 48 8 97 5 97 51 99 78
CW-L2-Strong 9 1 64 0 48 26 94 52
PGD-L2 53 6 80 0 37 11 88 16
HopSkipJump 71 69 93 78 56 49 97 89
TABLE III: MNIST - adversarial test accuracy
Transferability attacks. Tables V and VI and figure 3 summa-
rize the adversarial test accuracy against adversarial examples
created using the standard (undefended) model. The high test
accuracy scores show that a transferability attack doesn’t work
Attack Standard JacobReg NsLoss Combined
3 10 3 10 3 10 3 10
U
nt
ar
ge
te
d CW-L2 4 4 40 10 69 69 64 63
CW-L2-HC 5 4 82 9 69 69 64 63
CW-L2-Strong 4 4 41 8 67 67 64 63
PGD-L2 29 20 41 7 83 79 73 67
Ta
rg
et
ed
CW-L2 2 0 68 4 90 90 74 70
CW-L2-HC 4 0 90 9 90 90 76 73
CW-L2-Strong 1 0 72 2 89 89 74 70
PGD-L2 2 0 68 11 85 81 75 70
HopSkipJump 52 44 85 58 43 29 77 68
TABLE IV: CIFAR10 - adversarial test accuracy
against the Jacobian regularization-based models, the NsLoss
models, or combined models.
Attack Standard JacobReg NsLoss Combined
1 5 1 5 1 5 1 5
U
nt
ar
ge
te
d CW-L2 3 1 95 95 87 87 96 96
CW-L2-HC 17 1 94 94 81 79 96 96
CW-L2-Strong 2 1 95 95 90 90 96 96
PGD-L2 58 29 93 86 81 44 95 84
Ta
rg
et
ed
CW-L2 17 4 97 96 87 83 99 99
CW-L2-HC 48 8 97 95 90 77 99 97
CW-L2-Strong 9 1 97 96 89 86 99 99
PGD-L2 53 6 96 92 85 46 98 95
HopSkipJump 71 69 97 97 94 93 99 99
TABLE V: MNIST - adversarial test accuracy with transfer-
ability attack
Attack Standard JacobReg NsLoss Combined
3 10 3 10 3 10 3 10
U
nt
ar
ge
te
d CW-L2 4 4 87 87 83 83 87 87
CW-L2-HC 5 4 86 86 76 76 85 85
CW-L2-Strong 4 4 87 87 83 83 87 87
PGD-L2 29 20 80 60 32 21 53 22
Ta
rg
et
ed
CW-L2 2 0 90 90 84 84 87 87
CW-L2-HC 4 0 90 90 81 80 87 87
CW-L2-Strong 1 0 90 90 84 84 88 88
PGD-L2 2 0 87 82 38 6 76 64
HopSkipJump 52 44 91 90 90 89 89 89
TABLE VI: CIFAR10 - adversarial test accuracy with trans-
ferability attack
Adaptive attacks. Figure 1a presents the adversarial test
accuracy of our combined model as a function of the number
of CW-L2 targeted attack restarts. We obtained very similar
results for the untargeted CW-L2 attack. This can be clearly
seen, except for the slight decrease in test accuracy observed
during the first few attack restarts; note that up to 400
additional restarts were shown to have a negligible affect on
the test accuracy which implies that the model is robust to this
kind of attack.
Figure 1b shows the results of the C&W L2 with gradient
expectation over randomness attacks and a standard C&W L2
attack. It is clearly seen that the gradient expectation over
randomness has a negligible effect on the attack success rate,
which means that the model is robust to this adaptive attack
as well.
(a) C&W with random restart attack
(b) C&W with gradient expectation over randomness
Fig. 1: Adaptive attack results on CIFAR10 dataset
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The results of our experiments validate the effectiveness of
the proposed method in making the evaluated models robust
against a white-box adversary with full access to the model
and full knowledge of the defensive method. The proposed
defense is unique in that it successfully combines both state
of the art defensive approaches, namely: 1) Flattening the
loss gradients near the training samples to hinder white-box
attacks and 2) Pushing decision boundaries away from the
training data manifolds to weaken the adversarial nature of
adversarial examples found using boundary based attacks by
effectively increasing their perturbation distance from valid
inputs. Although recent work in the field suggests that the
existence of adversarial examples is inevitable, this work
presents an effective practical approach to greatly increase the
difficulty of finding them on the one hand, and weaken their
adversarial nature on the other hand.
The present work evaluates the proposed defensive method
on popular image classification benchmark datasets. However,
the method is generic and a possible extension of this research
is to apply it to additional domains and neural network
architectures.
(a) CIFAR10 dataset
(b) MNIST dataset
Fig. 2: Gradient-based and boundary-based attack results
(a) CIFAR10 dataset
(b) MNIST dataset
Fig. 3: Transferability attack results
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